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Abstract
Explanations of opinion bi-polarization hinge on the assumption of negative influence, individuals’ striving to amplify
differences to disliked others. However, empirical evidence for negative influence is inconclusive, which motivated us to
search for an alternative explanation. Here, we demonstrate that bi-polarization can be explained without negative
influence, drawing on theories that emphasize the communication of arguments as central mechanism of influence. Due to
homophily, actors interact mainly with others whose arguments will intensify existing tendencies for or against the issue at
stake. We develop an agent-based model of this theory and compare its implications to those of existing social-influence
models, deriving testable hypotheses about the conditions of bi-polarization. Hypotheses were tested with a group-
discussion experiment (N= 96). Results demonstrate that argument exchange can entail bi-polarization even when there is
no negative influence.
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Introduction
Theories of social and cultural differentiation [1,2], societal
stratification [3], ingroup favoritism [4], political polarization [5],
outgroup discrimination [6], and intergroup conflict [7,8] rely on
the assumption that individuals seek to accentuate differences
between themselves and negatively evaluated others. Sociological
approaches to social differentiation, for instance, explain the
development of elaborated cultural norms by the desire of high-
status actors to distinguish themselves from individuals with a
lower status [1,3,9–11]. In the same line of reasoning, psycholog-
ical theories relying on the self-categorization paradigm [8,12,13]
hold that humans adjust their opinions and behavior in order to
minimize the heterogeneity within their ingroup and to maximize
differences to outgroups [14].
The notion that individuals seek to intensify differences to
disliked others is of particular importance for explanations of the
phenomenon of bi-polarization, which is defined as the development
of increasingly antagonistic groups in a population, where opinion
differences between groups intensify and positions between the two
extremes of an opinion spectrum are over time increasingly
sparsely occupied [15,16]. Bi-polarization of opinions has puzzled
researchers for decades particularly when opinions vary continu-
ously, such as the degree to which voters are in favor or against a
political agenda [17,18]. Building on classical notions of social
influence [19–21], early formal models of social-influence dynam-
ics in networks [17,22–25] assumed exclusively positive influence.
That is, individuals were assumed to always seek consensus with
those they interact with, adapting their opinions towards the
opinions of their network partners in the course of interaction.
Strikingly, these models imply convergence cascades, which
eventually drive populations towards overall consensus as long as
there are no subgroups that are entirely cut off from outside
influences. But, as Abelson [17] observed, the empirical pattern
found in extensive research on opinion formation at the
community level resembled more that of bi-polarization than of
emergent consensus, leaving him to wonder ‘‘what on earth one
must assume in order to generate the bimodal outcome of
community cleavage studies’’. Echoing this question, Bonacich
and Lu [26] recently included explaining ‘‘how groups become
polarized or how two groups can become more and more
different’’ in their list of important unsolved problems of sociology.
In search for processes that give rise to bi-polarization despite
social influence, an increasing number of models have therefore
been proposed that combine both positive influence from similar
and negative influence, or distancing, from dissimilar sources
[2,5,27–31]. These models are able to explain bi-polarization in
populations where sufficiently many pairs of individuals experi-
ence negative social relationships (disliking of dissimilar others).
Those individuals further intensify initial opinion differences,
gradually developing opposing opinions and, in turn, influencing
also initially moderate individuals to adopt opinions on one of the
poles of the opinion scale.
Yet, empirical research on negative influence provided mixed
evidence and has, in addition, been criticized on methodological
grounds [32]. This raises the question whether bi-polarization of
continuous opinions can be explained without negative influence.
In other words, is it possible that distributions of continuous
opinions bi-polarize even in settings where individuals do not seek
to increase disagreement with negatively evaluated other members
of the population? In this paper, we demonstrate that it is possible,
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analyzing a new theory of bi-polarization, called ‘‘Argument-
communication theory of bi-polarization’’ (ACTB). To this end,
we develop a formal model of ACTB and report results from
computer simulations. The simulations demonstrate that ACTB is
able to explain bi-polarization in continuous opinions even in the
absence of negative influence and identify the conditions under
which ACTB predicts bi-polarization. We then report results of a
laboratory experiment that we conducted to empirically test
ACTB.
To be sure, we do not argue that theories that assume negative
influence fail to explain the bi-polarization dynamics, which have
been observed in empirical studies [33–35]. Instead, the weak
empirical support for the micro-level assumption of negative
influence leads us to explore whether and under what conditions it
is possible to explain the macro-level phenomenon of bi-
polarization without resorting to this assumption. Thus, ACTB
offers an alternative explanation of bi-polarization in continuous
opinions. The core difference to the existing literature is that
ACTB can explain bi-polarization even in settings where
individuals are not negatively influenced by others.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The next
section reviews existing formal models of social-influence dynamics
and shows that negative influence is a crucial assumption in
existing explanations of bi-polarization when opinions are
continuously scaled. We also summarize the outcomes of empirical
studies on negative influence. The third section summarizes the
core assumptions of ACTB and provides an intuition for why
ACTB is able to explain bi-polarization without negative
influence. The subsequent section describes the formal model of
ACTB and summarizes the results of our simulation study. Next,
we describe the empirical study and report the results. In the
concluding section, we summarize results and point to future
research.
1.1. Existing Explanations of Bi-polarization
Bi-polarization tendencies with regard to salient opinions have
been documented for example among college students [35] or in
culturally diverse work teams [33]. In a similar vein, observers of
the dynamics of social and political opinions found tendencies
towards bi-polarization on controversial issues such as attitudes
towards abortion, sexual morality, and the war in Iraq in the
American public, in particular during election periods [34,36–38].
Social interaction in a population does of course not always result
in bi-polarization. However, the empirical examples for the
phenomenon as well as the potentially severe consequences of
bi-polarization in a population render it highly important to
understand its mechanisms and conditions.
Classical theories of opinion dynamics in social networks
[17,22–25] as well as empirical research [15] on bi-polarization
focus on opinions that vary on a continuous scale. In contrast,
more recently several models were developed to study dynamics of
nominally scaled traits [2,39–45]. These nominal traits represent
for instance whether individuals adopt a piece of information
[2,40] or which political party the actors vote for [42].
For the purpose of our study, however, nominal opinion scales
are not useful for two reasons. First, many traits do not vary
qualitatively and are therefore described more accurately with
continuous scales. For instance, very few people agree or disagree
exactly with the program of a political party. Instead, people
usually agree to a certain degree. Second and most importantly,
nominal scales assume that sets of actors hold either perfectly
similar or perfectly dissimilar opinions on a given issue. As a
consequence, this scale type fails to capture a crucial aspect of
empirical research on opinion polarization, the intensification of
opinion disagreement on a given issue [15,16,34]. We therefore
follow classical models as well as empirical research and focus on
continuous opinions.
To be sure, continuous opinion scales are a conservative
assumption for models that are supposed to explain bi-polarization
without assuming negative influence. Previous work has shown
that for such models persistent diversity of opinions is particularly
difficult to explain when opinions are scaled continuously rather
than nominally. Intuitively, the reason is that with continuous
opinion scales, even very small opinion similarity is sufficient to
trigger a cascade of initially small opinion changes, which
gradually decrease opinion differences and eventually result in
consensus [46,47]. With nominal scales, such cascades can only
arise across multiple issues, but never within one-dimensional issue
spaces as they are investigated in empirical research. In a nominal
opinion space, agreement may increase when the number of issues
actors agree upon increases gradually, but on any single issue
actors are either perfectly similar or perfectly dissimilar [39].
1.1.1. Social segmentation, and homophily. Theoretical
models of continuous opinion dynamics are based on the
assumption of positive social influence [17,22–25]. Individuals
adjust their opinions in such a way as to become more similar to
their interaction partners, a process which is typically operationa-
lized as opinion averaging [48]. That is, it is assumed that
individuals adopt opinions that are equal to the average of their
own view and the opinion of influential network neighbors. The
surface graph shown in Panel A of Figure 1 provides a typical
example of the dynamics that positive social influence generates in
a population in which individuals are open to influence from all
others. The formal models that we used to generate the graphs of
Figure 1 are described in detail in Supporting Information S1. The
shading of the surface’s areas and the respective value on the z-axis
indicate the relative frequency of individuals that hold a certain
opinion at a given point in time. White areas indicate that nobody
holds the respective opinion. The darker the area, the more
individuals hold this opinion. At the outset of the influence
dynamics the opinion is uniformly distributed. However, the figure
shows that the variance of the opinion distribution decreases as a
result of social influence until, eventually, all individuals hold the
same opinion.
Classical contributions demonstrated that the result shown in
Panel A of Figure 1 can be generalized. More precisely,
researchers proved analytically that perfect uniformity is unavoid-
able, unless the population is segmented with absolutely no
influence between members of different segments [17,22–25]. In
clear contrast to this prediction, empirical studies report high
diversity of opinions and increasing opinion conflicts even in small
groups where no subgroup can avoid interaction with the
remainder of the group [33,35], findings which cannot be
explained by social segmentation.
In search for an explanation of opinion diversity, classical
models of social influence have been extended by including the
assumption of homophily alongside the earlier assumption of
positive social influence [18,40,43,49]. In particular, modelers of
continuous opinion dynamics incorporated that individuals have a
so-called ‘‘bounded confidence’’ [18,49] in others who hold very
different opinions and, thus, interact only with members of the
population whose opinions are sufficiently similar to their own.
Illustrating the dynamics that social influence implies when agents’
confidence in others is bounded, Panel B of Figure 1 shows ideal-
typical dynamics that obtain when initially the opinion is
uniformly distributed and individuals are positively influenced
only by those others who hold opinions that differ from their own
by no more than 20 percent of the range of the opinion scale. As
Differentiation without Distancing
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the figure shows, social influence in tandem with homophily can
result in the formation of clusters of individuals with minimal
opinion variation within and substantial opinion differences
between clusters. What is more, according to the bounded-
confidence model, this pattern is a stable outcome when opinion
differences between clusters exceed the bounded-confidence
threshold (20% of the opinion range in the example).
Homophily is a strong force in social interaction [50–53] and
needs to be taken into account in models of social influence.
However, homophily alone fails to provide an explanation of bi-
polarization for two reasons. First, as Panel B of Figure 1
demonstrates, social influence in tandem with homophily gener-
ates clusters of actors with opinions that are moderate and not bi-
polarized. Likewise, opinion differences between clusters do not
intensify but remain unchanged once dynamics have settled. In
contrast, bi-polarization means that opinion differences between
clusters increase over time.
Second, even though homophily plays a key role in many
interactions, it appears not reasonable to assume that homophily is
the only criterion that guides selection of interaction partners.
However, it has been shown that opinion clustering breaks down
when tiny deviations from the homophily mechanism are included
[47,54]. As an illustration, Panel C of Figure 1 shows ideal-typical
dynamics that unfold when so called ‘‘interaction noise’’ is added
to the bounded-confidence model [47]. To be more precise, these
dynamics obtain when – unlike in bounded confidence models –
there is a positive but very small probability that individuals are
influenced even by those others whose opinions falls outside of
their bounded confidence range. In this example, the probability
of influence in such a dyad was set to 0.01, where influence
occurred just like in the classic social-influence models. This is a
minimal change in the model assumption of the original bounded
confidence model, but it entails a dramatically different dynamic
[47]. Figure 1c shows that our modified bounded confidence
model can explain clustering only in the short term. In the long
run, small deviations from the bounded-confidence assumption
lead to social influence between members of distinct clusters and to
gradual opinion convergence.
Modelers have studied homophily also on the level of socio-
demographic attributes, including the assumption that similarity
on demographic variables motivates interaction and social
influence [2,55]. Socio-demographic characteristics are fixed or
change at a very slow rate, creating a cleavage along which
opinion differences between demographic groups can evolve and
intensify. However, socio-demographic cleavages are weak when
homophily is based on multiple demographic characteristics that
are not perfectly aligned [56,57]. Accordingly, social-influence
models predict that opinion clusters can form in the short term [2]
but will eventually converge when socio-demographic attributes
are not perfectly correlated [55].
1.1.2. Negative influence. The fragility of opinion diversity
in models with continuous opinions lead researchers to search for
processes that give rise to bi-polarization. An increasing number of
models have been proposed that combine both positive influence
from similar and negative influence from dissimilar sources
[2,5,27–31]. This assumption is typically motivated with notions
of social balance [58] and the reduction of cognitive dissonance
[59]. Intuitively, the idea is that agreement with a negatively
evaluated other creates psychological dissonance that can be
resolved by changing the own opinion such that disagreement
results (negative influence).
Panel D of Figure 1 shows typical dynamics that a combination
of positive and negative influence generates in a population that is
characterized by an initially uniform opinion distribution.
Populations experience bi-polarization if sufficiently many pairs
of individuals experience negative social relationships (disliking of
dissimilar others) and therefore tend to further intensify initial
opinion differences, gradually developing opposing opinions and
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motivating also initially moderate individuals to adopt opinions on
one of the poles of the opinion scale.
Negative influence can generate the same dynamics even when
at the outset of the simulation there are no agents with maximally
extreme opinions. If initial opinion variance is sufficiently high,
then negative influence will intensify opinions that initially lean
towards one of the poles and will lead, eventually, to maximally
extreme opinions. This dynamic of increased opinion differences
also between extremists cannot be generated by models that
assume only positive influence and averaging. Averaging implies
that opinions will never leave the range of initial opinions [48,60].
So far, negative influence appears to be the only social
mechanism that is able to explain bi-polarization when opinions
are continuous and confidence bounds are imperfect. However,
empirical tests have hitherto not provided unequivocal evidence in
support of the negative-influence assumption. In laboratory
experiments, researchers typically informed participants about
the opinions of members of fictitious in- and outgroups and then
measured pre-test-post-test opinion shifts [32]. The underlying
assumption in this line of work was that ingroup members are seen
as positive source of influence, while opinions of outgroup
members should exert negative influence. These studies have led
to mixed results. Many did not find support for negative influence
[14,32,61]. In addition, research illustrates that individuals may
publicly distance themselves from others but their private opinions
actually do not shift [62].
Moreover, methodological issues cast doubt on the conclusive-
ness of those studies that researchers interpreted as support for
negative influence [14,63–68]. Krizan and Baron [32] raised a
number of issues with regard to experiments that focus on negative
influence by members of outgroups. For instance, the authors
criticize that oftentimes experimental settings do not explicitly
refer to a particular outgroup and, thus, do not specify the point of
reference for negative influence [69], making it difficult to attribute
observed opinion changes to the motivation to intensify differences
to outgroups. In addition, a typical strategy adopted in, e.g.,
experiments based on the minimal group paradigm [70] is to
assign participants to temporary groups, ‘‘raising questions
regarding whether any significant feelings of group identification
develop’’ [32].
We point here to two major additional problems. First, some
experimental designs do not allow to disentangle positive influence
from the ingroup and negative influence from the outgroup in the
explanation of opinion shifts [14,67,68]. In these studies,
participants have been exposed two sources of social influence,
ingroup members and outgroup members. Participants were
exposed to ingroup members who held opinions relatively similar
to their own. Some of these ingroup members held more extreme
opinions than the participant. Outgroup members always had
opinions distinct from those of the participants. With such a
design, opinion changes away from the outgroup opinion may
have been caused by both negative influence from the outgroup or
positive influence from more extreme ingroup members [71].
A second problem is that other studies did not control for
general opinion drifts during the experiment [64,65]. For example,
Mazen and Leventhal [64] confronted expectant mothers with a
favorable description of breast feeding and measured how this
affected the mothers’ opinions on this issue. They found that
mothers developed more positive opinions when they received
information from a communicator with a similar skin color
(positive influence). However, when the communicator and the
mother were dissimilar in skin color, the opinions of the mothers
turned more negative. This suggests that these mothers were
influenced negatively by the communicator. However, this result
may also have been caused by a general trend towards more
negative opinions. In this study, the second opinion measurement
took place one week after the first. In this period, all participants
might have developed more negative opinions. Possibly, those
mothers who where similar to the communicator were positively
influenced by them and changed their minds back to more positive
opinions. The opinions of the dissimilar mothers, however, might
have been unaffected by the communicator’s information and
remained more negative. Such trend effects were not controlled
for in these analyses. It is therefore not clear whether the reported
opinion dynamics are the result of negative influence or of opinion
drifts.
In a nutshell, existing theories of bi-polarization in continuous
opinion dynamics critically hinge on the assumption of negative
influence. However, there is hitherto no conclusive empirical
evidence supporting this assumption. In the following, we propose,
analyze, and the test an alternative approach that does not rely on
negative influence.
1.2. Explaining Bi-polarization without Negative Influence
In the tradition of classic notions like Adam Smith’s famous
‘‘invisible hand’’, social scientists have emphasized that social
phenomena can emerge even though individuals do not strive to
create them or actually even seek to prevent their emergence
[72,73]. Most prominently, Schelling [73] demonstrated that
residential segregation can emerge even though individuals accept
to live in neighborhoods where the vast majority of their neighbors
holds different demographic characteristics. Similarly, populations
may fail to produce collective goods even though all members of
the population have a great interest in the provision of the good,
because everyone assumes that collective action will succeed
without their own contribution [74].
In a similar vein, we propose that initially homogeneous
populations can fall apart into subgroups with opposing opinions
even though individuals do not seek to distance themselves from
any other member of the population and social influence is only
positive. Our new theory, called ‘‘Argument-communication
theory of bi-polarization’’ (ACTB), is inspired by earlier theorizing
on demographic faultlines [56] and group polarization [75–77],
which combined insights from Persuasive Argument Theory (PAT)
[78,79] and research on homophily [50,51,53,80,81].
PAT [78,79] assumes that individuals base their opinions on pro
and con arguments. During discussion, individuals are exposed to
the arguments their interaction partners consider relevant. In
groups where members tend towards a specific opinion already
prior to discussion, mainly those arguments will be brought up that
favor the prevailing tendency. Discussion members, thus, provide
each other with further arguments that support their initial
position. This intensifies opinions and aggregates to a collective
opinion shift towards more extreme positions.
Building on earlier work [56,75,76], we argue that the interplay
of the argument communication described by PAT with homo-
phily can give rise to bi-polarization. The idea is that small initial
opinion differences in a group are gradually amplified when
argument communication occurs more frequently between those
individuals who initially have relatively similar opinions than
between those whose opinions are relatively dissimilar. Due to
homophily, individuals with opinions leaning towards the same
pole of the opinion spectrum interact more likely with each other
than with those who lean towards opposite poles. Thus, persuasive
argument communication reinforces existing opinion tendencies,
but in opposing directions in the separate subsets of group
members who share the same initial tendency. This further
reduces the likelihood of interaction between initially dissimilar
Differentiation without Distancing
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pairs of individuals, which in turn further strengthens existing
tendencies. This process unfolds simultaneously at both sides of the
opinion spectrum, such that a self-reinforcing dynamic may arise
that entails bi-polarization even in the absence of negative
influence.
The core ingredient that ACTB adds to existing approaches to
social influence is the communication of arguments. Abstracting
from arguments, existing social-influence models assume that
individuals inform each other about their opinions during
interaction, a process which modelers typically implemented as
opinion averaging [17,18,23,24,48,49]. On the one hand,
averaging appears to be a realistic operationalization of social
influence when individuals with different opinions influence each
other, because it implies decreasing opinion differences. On the
other hand, averaging implies that individuals do not adjust their
opinions when they interact with others with whom they already
agree, because the average of two identical values is similar to
these values. In clear contrast, social psychological [75] and
sociological [82] research on the opinion dynamics in discussion
groups suggests that through the communication of arguments
interaction partners with similar opinions can provide each other
with new arguments which reinforce their initial opinion and, thus,
leads to intensified views that may be more extreme than those of
any of the participants were prior to the interaction [75,78].
Analyses
1.3. A Formal Model of Argument Exchange
1.3.1. Purpose of the formal study. Developing a formal
representation of ACTB was necessary for two main reasons. First,
we sought to formally demonstrate the logical validity of the
counter-intuitive claim that bi-polarization can emerge even in the
absence of negative influence. Likewise, a formal analysis of the
theory was necessary because its ability to explain bi-polarization
might hinge on potentially problematic assumptions. For instance,
bi-polarization requires homophily according to our informal
reasoning. However, it remains unclear how strong homophily
needs to be, in order to render bi-polarization a likely outcome of
the dynamic. As long as there is some probability of interaction
also between actors with dissimilar opinions, bi-polarization
tendencies might be very unlikely. When actors with dissimilar
opinions interact, they likely exchange arguments that speak
against their current tendency and lead to more moderate
opinions. Furthermore, in subsequent interaction actors will
transmit these counter arguments to similar others. This will lead
to further opinion convergence. In sum, this reasoning suggests
that even though actors may tend to interact with similar others,
occasional deviations from this rule may suffice to impede the bi-
polarization tendencies generated by argument communication
and homophily. In a non-deterministic world, there is no
guarantee that a self-reinforcing dynamic eventually leads a social
system into the state towards which the dynamic pushes it. This
has for example been demonstrated for formal stochastic models of
residential segregation [83], or cultural dissemination [84]. In
these models, the ‘‘ordered’’ outcomes towards which individual
decision rules drive the system, such as highly segregated
residential distributions, or local clustering of similar cultures,
only arise when the level of randomness in individual decision
making is sufficiently small. Accordingly, we sought to analyze
how strong homophily needs to be in order to give rise to bi-
polarization.
Second, the formal model of ACTB guided the design of the
laboratory experiment. The highly controlled nature of laboratory
experiments allowed us to incorporate the core design features of
the experiment in our formal model and to study the theoretical
implications of argument exchange in this particular setting. These
model implications could be compared to predictions of existing
models of exclusively positive [17] and simultaneous positive and
negative [29] influence, helping to identify the conditions under
which ACTB implies predictions distinct from those of existing
models. These conditions were implemented in the design of our
laboratory experiment, creating a decisive test of the new theory
against existing models of bi-polarization.
1.3.2. The formal model. Our agent-based model of ACTB
implements the substantive assumptions of PAT and homophily
for each of N interdependent individuals who simultaneously
participate in an artificial influence process. Each individual is
represented as an agent i, with a numerically valued opinion oi,t
({1ƒoi,tƒz1) which represents the agent’s stance on a given
issue at time point t. We assume that there is a limited number of
arguments that address the issue. The valence of an argument is
expressed numerically. More precisely, P pro arguments (al=1)
and C con arguments (al=21) are available. This is summarized
in the argument vector, an array of arguments with P+C elements.
Elements with a row number smaller than P+1 hold pro
arguments, i.e. al= +1. The remaining elements contain con
arguments, i.e. al=21.
Empirical research suggests that people have limited capacities
to remember and process information [85,86]. Accordingly, we
assume that at a given time point t agent i’s opinion is based only
on a subset of Si,t relevant arguments (Si,t#P+C). The remaining
arguments are not relevant in the opinion formation. For each
agent i, the relevance vector summarizes which of the arguments
are relevant. This vector has P+C elements which adopt the value
one if the respective argument l is considered relevant (ri,t,l=1) and
zero if the argument is not relevant (ri,t,l=0).
Technically, an agent’s opinion is the average value of the
arguments al that the agent considers relevant (see equation 1). For
simplicity, we assume that all relevant arguments have the same
persuasiveness. This is expressed by the assumption that all








For example, an agent i that bases her opinion on 6 pro
arguments (Si,t=6) holds an opinion of oi,t = 1. However, if the
agent considers 3 pro and 3 con arguments relevant, then the
opinion will adopt the value zero.
Following research on memory processes [87] and existing
models of social influence [2,40], we assume that agents disregard
pieces of information that have not been communicated in recent
interactions. This is implemented for each agent in a recency
vector. This vector has P+C elements and each element indicates
how recent the respective argument is for the agent. Elements of
the recency vector with a row number smaller than P+1 identify
the relevance of pro arguments. The remaining elements
determine the relevance of con arguments. Arguments are either
relevant or not, but agents rank the Si,t relevant arguments
according to their recency. We denote the recency of an argument
(sl,i,t) with integer values between 0 and Si,t (sl,i,t[ 0,:::Si,tf g). A
value of sl,i,t=0 indicates that the argument al is not sufficiently
recent and therefore not relevant for actor i. Values above zero
indicate that this argument is sufficiently recent and therefore
affects actor i’s opinion. The most recent argument has the value
Differentiation without Distancing
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of sl,i,t= Si,t, the second most recent argument has the value Si,t21,
and so on. Thus, if an agent considers three arguments (Si,t=3)
then one argument has a recency of 1, one has a recency of 2, and
one has a recency of 3. The recency rank of an argument does not
affect the extent to which an argument shapes the current opinion
(see equation 1). However, the recency determines how long an
argument affects the agent’s opinion in the influence process. The
exact rules for updating argument recency will be elaborated
further below.
Similar to existing models of social influence [2,39,49], we
model the opinion formation process as a sequence of events t,
each event corresponding to one interaction between two agents.
An interaction consists of a partner selection phase and a
subsequent social influence phase. In the partner selection phase,
two agents from the population are matched for interaction, based
on opinion-homophily. Subsequently, an opinion of one of the
interacting agents is updated as a result of the interaction. The
updating rule operationalizes the argument exchange mechanism
of PAT.
We implement the partner selection phase as follows. In each
event, the computer first randomly picks an agent i*. Then an
interaction partner j (j?i*) is selected. The probability that agent j
is chosen as interaction partner depends on the similarity between
i* and j, simi*,j,t, that varies between 0 and 1. A similarity of zero
expresses maximal dissimilarity, whereas simi*,j,t=1 if both actors






The probability that agent i* chooses j as interaction partner
(pj,t) derives from their relative similarity, that is: the degree to









Equation 3 implements homophily. The more similar j is to i*
the higher is the probability that they will interact [2,40]. If two
agents hold maximally opposing opinions then the probability of
interaction equals zero. Making it possible to vary the strength of
homophily, we include the parameter h into the model. The higher
the value of h, the steeper is the increase of the likelihood that j will
be chosen by i* as an interaction partner in the relative similarity
of i* and j. The actual selection of the interaction partner of i* is
implemented by a random draw of one agent from the set of all
other group members, based on the probabilities pj,t given by (3).
Next, i* is socially influenced by the selected interaction partner
j* based on the persuasive arguments mechanism. For this, the
computer randomly picks one argument, al*, out of the Sj*,t
arguments that j* considers relevant. Each relevant argument has
the same probability to be chosen (1/Sj*,t). Arguments that are not
relevant for j* are not chosen. The chosen argument is then
adopted by i*. Technically, its recency for i* is updated to a value
of Si*,t+1 (sl*,i*,t= Si*,t+1). Subsequently, the recency of all
arguments that have non-zero recency in i*’s recency vector is
reduced by one, if prior to the interaction the corresponding
argument was more recent for i* than the argument adopted from
j*. As a result, the argument that was communicated by j*
becomes relevant for i* and attains the highest recency of all
argument that i* considers relevant (sl*,i*,t= Si*,t).
This updating procedure implements the assumptions that
agents tend to forget dated information [2,40,87]. It implies in
particular that agents forget one of the arguments previously
relevant for them, if they have learned a new argument in the
interaction. This assures that the number of arguments that is
relevant for an agent is kept constant at Si,t throughout the
influence process. Technically, this assumption makes the
subscript t in Si,t superfluous. Below, however, we also consider a
model version where agents do not forget arguments because in
the setting of the laboratory experiment it was very unlikely that
participants forget arguments.
Interaction events are iterated until the system reaches
equilibrium. Our model has exactly two equilibria, perfect
consensus and maximal bi-polarization. Perfect consensus is
reached when all agents hold the same opinion and base it on
the same set of arguments. Perfect consensus is a stable situation
because agents can transmit only arguments that their interaction
partners already consider relevant. This implies that opinions will
not be affected by argument exchange. Maximal bi-polarization
obtains if there are two maximally distinct subgroups and the
members of each subgroup agree on opinions and arguments with
each other. That is, the members of the subgroups have
coordinated on the opposite poles of the opinion scale and the
pairwise similarity (simi,j,t) between agents of different subgroups is
zero. In this situation, the probability is zero that agents interact
who belong to different subgroups (see equation 3). Argument
exchange between the subgroups is thus precluded. In addition,
interaction of agents that belong to the same subgroup can not
lead to opinion changes because these agents base their opinion on
either exclusively pro-arguments or exclusively con- arguments.
Any outcome of the process that is not perfect consensus or perfect
bi-polarization can not be an equilibrium. The reason is that any
other outcome implies that there are differences in opinions or
arguments between agents, and a positive probability of interac-
tion between the agents who hold different opinion or arguments.
There is thus a positive probability that the distribution of
arguments and opinions in the population will change due to
interaction.
1.3.3. Dynamics of Bi-polarization: an illustrative simulation
run. Figure 2 shows a surface graph that shows ideal-typical opinion
dynamics that the formal model of ACTB generates. For this
illustrative simulation run, we imposed conditions for which ACTB
predicts bi-polarization tendencies to be very strong. Accordingly, we
imposed relatively strong homophily, assuming h=9. With this value,
homophily is so strong that interaction between agents who do not
hold perfectly similar opinions is extremely unlikely. Furthermore, we
assumed that thirty pro and con arguments are available (P=C=30)
and all agents always consider 10 relevant arguments for opinion
formation (Si,t=10 for all i and t). For this condition, we simulated a
population of 100 agents, the same population size that we assumed for
the ideal-typical simulation runs that are shown in Figure 1. We
studied the change of agents’ opinions and argument vectors over
30,000 simulation events. The latter implies that each agent’s opinion
is updated 300 times on average.
The initial distribution of arguments and opinions was created
by assigning to each agent a random set of 5 pro and 5 con
arguments. With this, all agents started with the same opinion at
the middle of the opinion scale (oi,0=0 for all i). Thus, at the outset
there were no opinion differences between agents. According to
ACTB, this does not rule out opinion changes, as there are still
differences between agents in the arguments on which their
opinions are based. In contrast, social-influence models that
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implement influence as opinion averaging predict zero future
opinion changes when all agents hold the same opinion [48]. The
same holds for models that assume both positive and negative
social influence, because in these models negative influence only
occurs when there are sufficiently strong opinion differences
between agents already at the outset of the influence process [88].
Hence, ACTB and existing models of social influence imply
critically different opinion dynamics that unfold from perfect
opinion uniformity, making this an interesting initial condition to
demonstrate the theoretical implications of ACTB.
Figure 2 shows a surface graph which depicts the development
of the opinion distribution during a typical simulation run. At the
beginning of the simulation (event zero), all 100 agents hold the
same opinion. The figure shows how bi-polarization emerges in
this simulation run. While opinions are approximately uniformly
distributed after about 10,000 simulation events, the distribution
becomes bimodal after about 15,000 events. Subsequently, the two
modes gradually become more accentuated and shift towards the
opposite ends of the opinion spectrum until, after about 30,000
events, the population is almost entirely split into two approxi-
mately equally large subsets of agents with opinions of 21 and +1,
respectively.
Opinion change is possible despite initial uniformity, because
agents base their opinion on different (randomly assigned) sets of
five pro and five con arguments. Thus, in some interactions agents’
opinions shift away from the initial consensus, because they learn a
new pro (con) argument and forget a con (pro) argument. Their
new opinion is then based on more pro (con) than con (pro)
arguments and takes a positive (negative) value. Figure 2 shows
that this results in an increase of the variance of the opinion
distribution in the first phase of the simulation run. After about
10,000 simulation events, the opinion is approximately uniformly
distributed. Due to the strong homophily, agents are matched with
interaction partners that have adjusted their opinion in the same
direction. These interaction partners will more likely provide each
other with arguments that further intensify their opinion tendency
rather than to communicate arguments that render their opinions
more moderate again. Eventually the opinion trajectories of all
agents move to one of the two outer ends of the opinion scale. At
this point, the opinion distribution stabilizes, because agents base
their opinions on either only pro or only con arguments such that
interaction is only possible between agents who already hold
identical opinions. Agents can no longer learn arguments that
could change their opinions.
1.3.4. Effects of homophily. According to ACTB, commu-
nication of persuasive argument can create bi-polarization only if
interaction partners are selected based on homophily. In order to
test whether homophily always entails bi-polarization, or whether
bi-polarization can only arise when homophily is sufficiently
strong, we conducted a simulation experiment in which we varied
the model parameter h between 0 (no homophily) and 8 (strong
homophily) in steps of 1. Per condition, we ran 500 independent
realizations of the simulation. In all simulations of this experiment,
we studied populations of 20 agents (N=20). This is a plausible
group size for school classes and work teams [89], two of the
settings for which theory and empirical accounts of intra-group
conflicts suggest the possibility of bi-polarization dynamics [56].
Research on human cognitive capabilities suggests that humans
can process and recall between 4 and 7 chunks of information
[85,86]. For the simulation experiment, we therefore imposed that
agents always base their opinions on six arguments (Si,t=6 for all i
and t). We replicated the simulation experiment with higher and
lower values of the parameter S and did not find qualitative
differences. We found stronger bi-polarization when agents
consider fewer arguments for opinion formation. This effect
obtains because it takes agents at least S interactions to drop a
newly adopted argument. Thus, when an agent with an extreme
opinion happens to adopt a counter argument, then this counter
argument will remain relevant longer if S is high. It follows that
this agent will hold a more moderate opinion for a longer period.
Figure 2. Bi-polarization generated by argument exchange and homophily (N=100, P=C=30, S=10, h=9).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0074516.g002
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This, in turn, increases the probability that the agent interacts with
agents that hold opposing opinions and adopts further counter
arguments. In sum, high values of S make it more likely that agents
with an extreme opinion adopt moderate opinion values and
therefore decrease bi-polarization.
Furthermore, we assumed that there are 20 pro and 20 con
arguments (P=C=20) available. These values create sufficient
variation in the initial argument sets also between agents who
happen to hold identical opinions. For this, P and C should
considerably exceed S. Otherwise agents with similar opinions are
likely to base their opinions on similar sets of arguments. This
would preclude the possibility that argument exchange between
agents with similar opinions renders their opinions more extreme
because they provide each other with arguments that they already
consider relevant. Furthermore, we created the initial condition
such that opinions are uniformly distributed. For this, we
randomly assigned to each agent one of the S+1 possible opinion
values and then randomly picked one of the possible sets of S
arguments which correspond to the selected opinion value.
Figure 3 summarizes the results. Panel A of Figure 3 shows how
homophily strength h affected the proportion of runs that ended in
a perfect split into two maximally antagonistic subgroups. When
homophily strength was below h=3 all runs ended in consensus.
At h=3, only one out of the 500 replications for this condition
ended in a group split with two subgroups at the opposing poles.
For higher values of homophily strength h, panel A shows that the
stronger homophily was, the more runs ended in a perfect group
split.
If a simulation run ends in perfect consensus, there may
nonetheless have been a temporary period of significant bi-
polarization in the dynamic. To test for this possibility, we assessed
for each event of the simulation runs the degree to which the
population was bi-polarized. In the following, we refer to this as
the ‘‘degree of bi-polarization’’ at a given point in time. Following
Flache and Ma¨s [28,90], the degree of bi-polarization was
measured with the standard deviation of the distribution of
pairwise opinion distances between all pairs of agents in the
population. This measure takes its maximal value, one, when there
are two equally large and maximally different subgroups. The
minimal value, zero, is obtained for perfect opinion consensus. In
between these two extremes, the bi-polarization measure increases
in the extent to which the opinion distribution is bimodal, with
equally large modes at opposite extreme ends of the opinion
spectrum. Panel B in Figure 3 compares the average degree of bi-
polarization at the outset of the simulation runs with the average
maximal degree of bi-polarization that occurred during the
simulations. Under all conditions, the simulations started with
random, uniform opinion distributions. This resulted for all
conditions in a low degree of bi-polarization in the initial situation
(indicated by the black areas of the bars). The white areas of the
bars indicate the average maximal degree of bi-polarization
obtained in a simulation run. Panel B shows that the stronger
homophily, h, the higher the increase of bi-polarization between
the initial condition and the maximum level of bi-polarization.
Furthermore, bi-polarization increased only slightly in the course
of a simulation run when homophily was weak (h,4). In these
conditions the simulated populations hardly bi-polarized. Only
strong homophily could give rise to significant levels of bi-
polarization.
Finally, we wanted to know whether higher homophily strength
accelerated the emergence of bi-polarization. For this, panel C in
Figure 3 informs about the average number of simulations events
that it took to reach the equilibrium in those runs that ended with
perfect bi-polarization. This measure serves as an indicator of the
duration of the bi-polarization process. The conditions with weak
homophily (h,3) are neglected in Panel C, because only one out of
2000 runs ended in bi-polarization in these conditions. The graph
shows that the weaker homophily the more events it took until bi-
polarization was reached. These results indicate that bi-polariza-
tion is not only possible under strong homophily. The self-
reinforcing process that leads to bi-polarization may evolve also if
homophily is only moderately strong. However, with moderate
homophily it may take a considerable amount of time until a group
splits up into opposing factions. This also highlights the
mechanism that underlies the effect of homophily strength on
the likelihood of bi-polarization. The longer it takes before the
equilibrium of bi-polarization is reached, the more likely it is that
Figure 3. Results from simulation experiment on the effects of
homophily on the degree of bi-polarization (500 runs per
condition, N=20, P=C=20, S=6).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0074516.g003
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in the process agents interact with dissimilar others and learn
arguments counter to their current opinion tendency. If this
happens, it is likely that agents further spread the counter
arguments within the subset of the population that leans towards
the same pole of the opinion spectrum. As a consequence, bi-
polarization declines again and the population becomes more
likely to move towards the other possible equilibrium, perfect
consensus. This explains why perfect group splits occur only rarely
under moderate homophily [55].
To summarize, our computational experiments yielded two
main findings. First, the informal reasoning proposed above is
consistent: The interplay of homophily and argument communi-
cation can entail bi-polarization. Second, bi-polarization obtains
only when homophily is sufficiently strong. To assure that these
conclusions can be generalized beyond the specific parameter
setting that we inspected in the computational experiments
reported in this paper, we have conducted extensive additional
tests, varying the remaining parameters of our model (N, P, C, S).
We have not found any combination of these parameters that
generated a stable split into two maximally dissimilar subgroups
under weak homophily (h,2). This suggests that strong homophily
is a necessary condition of bi-polarization.
1.4. The Empirical Study
1.4.1. Overview. The purpose of the laboratory experiment
was twofold. First, we aimed to test the new theoretical element
that ACTB adds to existing models of social influence, the
communication of arguments. More specifically, we tested in a
computerized social-influence experiment with human subjects,
whether social influence in terms of argument communication
results in opinion dynamics that differ in the theoretically
predicted way from those dynamics that communication in terms
of opinions creates. To this end, we compared empirical opinion
dynamics in three between-subjects treatments. In the Only-opinion-
condition, participants informed each other only about their current
opinion without adding any further information. This treatment
was designed to test the influence process that is assumed both in
classical models of positive social influence, as well as in models
that combined positive and negative influence on continuous
opinions, where agents change their opinions directly in response
to observed opinions of other agents [17,22–25]. The second
condition of our experiment was the Only-argument-condition. In this
condition, subjects could transmit only arguments pro or con a
particular position on the issue at stake during the discussion, but
did not observe others’ opinions. This condition allowed to test the
influence process that ACTB assumes. We test in our experiment
each of the models under the scope-condition that matches their
theoretical assumptions about the influence process. This does,
however, give no insight into which models’ predictions give a
better match with the empirically observed pattern when both
types of influence processes can occur simultaneously. According-
ly, we included into our experiment a third treatment where
participants transmitted both their opinion and an argument
(Opinion-and-arguments-condition). This allows to test whether the
effects of argument communication are robust to the presence of
direct influence from exposure to others’ opinions.
The second purpose of the empirical study was to test whether
communication of arguments can result in bi-polarization, putting
to the test the core prediction of ACTB. This requires an
experimental design that allows drawing conclusions about
whether observed bi-polarization tendencies have been caused
by argument communication or by the combination of positive
and negative influence. To this end, we took advantage of a result
of our computer simulation experiment, namely that ACTB
predicts bi-polarization to obtain only when individuals are
exposed to interaction partners with similar opinions (homophily).
As we will show in detail below, social-influence models that
assume only positive influence as well as models that combine
positive with negative influence do not generate bi-polarization
under this condition. In contrast, models that include negative
influence predict bi-polarization to obtain when individuals with
dissimilar opinions interact. Therefore, participants of all three
experimental treatments interacted in the first part of the
experiment with others who held similar opinions (homophilous
matching of interaction partners). Subsequently, participants with
dissimilar opinions where matched for interaction (heterophilous
matching).
To be sure, the experiment was primarily designed to test
ACTB and should not be understood as a general test of the
negative-influence assumption. Our design does inform about
whether the bi-polarization tendencies that we observed in this
experiment were the result of argument communication or
negative influence. However, not finding support for negative
influence in this experiment does not challenge this assumption in
general as it is still possible that negative influence plays an
important role in other contexts. For instance, it has been argued
that individuals are negatively influenced by interaction partners
who differ on socio-demographic dimensions or are perceived to
belong to an out-group because these differences may entail
disliking [2,14,28,91]. In the experiment, however, we decided not
to inform participants about socio-demographic characteristics or
group-memberships of their interaction partners, deliberately
making disliking and negative influence unlikely from the
perspective of those theories. If we find bi-polarization in this
setting, this would be surprising from the point of view of earlier
explanations, because it would show that bi-polarization can
emerge even in the absence of negative influence.
The experimental data will be provided by the first author upon
request.
1.4.2. Experimental design. In each experimental session,
we invited 8 participants to a computer laboratory where they sat
in separate cubicles. We informed them that they would not be
deceived during the experiment and that we had designed the
experiment in order to study the formation of individual opinions
in a social setting. Participants were asked to imagine that they
were member of a discussion group that talks about the best
location for building a new leisure center. This new center could
be constructed in one of two hypothetical towns (town A and town
B) or at any place in between these two towns. We chose this
artificial issue because participants had no previous knowledge
about it. This made it possible to impose the arguments that were
known to each of the participants. In addition, the best spot for the
leisure center can be identified on an interval scale, providing the
participants an unambiguous way to inform each other about their
opinion. After all participants had confirmed that they had
understood the instructions, we started the computer program that
ran the experiment. From this moment on, communication took
place on the computers screens.
In the first phase of the experiment, each participant received a
different set of three arguments. Each argument suggests that
either town A or town B is the better place for the new leisure
center. For example, one of the pro town A arguments reads:
‘‘There is a university in town A. The nearer the leisure center will
be build to town A, the more students will be attracted’’.
Altogether there were six arguments pro town A and six pro town
B. Half of the participants received two arguments pro town A and
one pro town B and the other half received one pro town A and
two pro town B. In the following, we therefore refer to those
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participants who received two pro town A arguments as ‘‘A-types’’
and to the others as ‘‘B-types’’. Whether a specific participant was
of type A or B was assigned randomly. In pilot studies, we asked
participants to rate the importance of 20 arguments on a seven-
point scale ranging from ‘‘very unimportant’’ (1) to ‘‘very
important’’ (7). In the experiment, we included only those 12
arguments with an average rating of at least 5.5.
After each participant had read the initial set of arguments,
participants expressed the first time their opinion about the best
location for the new leisure center. We used a scale ranging from
250 (town A) to +50 (town B). Participants could choose any value
between the two extremes.
In the second phase, each participant interacted once with each
of the seven other participants of the session. In the first three
rounds (homophilous matching phase) interactions took only place
between participants who had received the same number of pro
town A and pro town B arguments, imposing homophily, the
central precondition of bi-polarization according to the new
theory. In the remaining 4 interactions, participants were
subsequently matched with the 4 participants of their session
who had another number of pro-A and pro-B arguments
(heterophilous matching phase). We used this interaction schedule
in all three between-subject conditions. Participants were not
aware of the schedule. We only informed them that they would
interact once with each participant of the experiment. All
interactions did really take place. Participants were not deceived.
The experiment focused on testing whether the communication
of arguments implies bi-polarization and was designed to control
as much as possible for effects of other model ingredients. In
particular, we sought to prevent that in case of falsification of our
predictions, other model ingredients could be held responsible for
the lack of support for the new model. One possible reason for
falsification could be that in the experiment, with its relatively
short duration in time, individuals might not forget arguments that
they learned in previous interactions. We even deliberately
suppressed this possibility in the experiment in order to prevent
that selective remembering of arguments could blur the link
between arguments and opinion. Participants could always read a
complete list of those arguments which they had received at the
very beginning and which they had come across during the
experiment. If individuals do not forget arguments, however, then
repeated argument exchange will result in a situation where all
participants consider relevant all existing arguments for opinion
formation and, in turn, adopt a moderate opinion. In other words,
if participants of the experiment do not forget arguments, then bi-
polarization would be rather unlikely. To allow bi-polarization
while precluding forgetting at the same time, we implemented that
all participants who received two pro town A (B) arguments
received the same pro town B (A) argument. As a consequence,
participants who received during the homophilous-matching
phase an argument against their initial tendency, always received
an argument that was already known to them before the exchange
of arguments. Argument supporting the initial tendency, however,
could be new to the participant. With this, it was possible that a
participant’s initial tendency could intensify through interaction,
but this was at the same time not guaranteed because opinions
were not determined by the arguments.
We made participants explicitly aware of the fact that they had
received different sets of arguments. However, we did not inform
them about the exact distribution of arguments. Hence, partici-
pants were not aware of the two types and thus no social
categorization was possible on basis of the initial distribution of
arguments.
In the Only-opinion-condition, each interaction consisted of two
steps. First, the computer informed the participants about their
partners’ opinion on the best location for the leisure center,
showing the partner’s most recent opinion rating. Second, all
participants rated again where they personally thought the best
place for the leisure center was. The interactions in the Only-
argument-condition consisted of three steps. First, both interaction
partners were asked to select which of their arguments should be
transmitted to their current interaction partner. Second, partici-
pants read which argument their respective partner had transmit-
ted. Whenever a participant had received a new argument then
this argument was added to this participant’s list of arguments and
could later be transmitted to interaction partners. Finally, the
participants expressed their opinion again. The new opinion
rating, however, was not communicated to the current interaction
partners. The Opinions-and-arguments-condition was very similar to the
Only-argument-condition except for the fact that in step 2, participants
did not only read the transmitted argument but also learned the
opinion of the respective partner about the best location of the
leisure center.
1.4.3. Predictions of the Competing Models of Social
Influence
Models of social influence predict critically different opinion
dynamics to obtain in the setting of the experiment. We focus here
on three models of social influence: (i) standard social influence
models which assume only positive influence, (ii) models that also
include negative influence, and (iii) ACTB. In order to derive exact
predictions about the opinion dynamic that each of these three
theories implies in the setting of the laboratory experiment, we
included the main design features of the experiment in the formal
models.
First, we included assumptions about the initial opinions of the
participants, which followed from the initial assignment of
arguments in the experiment. Thus, we implemented that four
participants of each discussion group should hold negative opinion
values (A-types) and that the remaining opinions should be positive
(B-types). To be more precise, equation 1 implies that participants
held opinions of 216.66 or +16.66. These values represent
opinions on the opinion scale that was used in the experiment
which ranges from250 (town A) to +50 (town B). In order to use the
same opinion scale as existing models and ACTB, we linearly
transformed the opinions to a value range between 21 and +1,
arriving at initial opinion values of 2.33 (A-types) and +.33 (B-
types). Second, we implemented the interaction schedule that we
imposed in the experiment (first homophilous then heterophilous
matching).
Standard social-influence models. These models operatio-
nalize social influence as averaging, an assumption that we
implemented with Equation 4. This equation implies that the
opinion oi,t of agent i at interaction period t is a function of her
previous opinion (oi,t21) and the opinion of the interaction partner
(oj,t21). The influence weights wij,t describe the direction and
strength of influence that participant j exerts influence on i’s
opinion and were fixed to the value of +1 for all pairs of interaction
partners. This assumes that influence is always positive. Equation 4
furthermore implies that the relative impact of the interaction
partner’s opinion declines in the number of previous interactions
of the focal agent, which implements the assumption that agents
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consider the opinion of all previous interaction partners with equal






In Figure 4, Panel A shows the opinion dynamics, which follow
deterministically from equation 4 and the assumptions about the
initial opinions and the interaction schedule that we implemented
in the experiment. The upper (lower) thin solid line depicts the
average opinion of the 4 participants of type B (A). The distance
between the two lines (highlighted by the gray area) serves as a
measure of opinion distance between the two types. The bold lines
inform about the degree of bi-polarization, which was measured in
the same way as in the computational experiment reported above
and informs about the degree to which the groups fall apart into
homogeneous subgroups with opposed opinions. The dotted lines
in the graphs highlight the changes in average degree of bi-
polarization during the first three (homophilous matching) and the
last four interactions (heterophilous matching).
During the first three interactions, participants interacted with
those group members who held an identical opinion. The
averaging assumption that is operationalized in Equation 4 implies
that these interactions do not result in opinion changes.
Accordingly, the graph in Panel A of Figure 4 shows that
according to classical social-influence models neither the degree of
bi-polarization nor the opinion averages of the two types of
discussion members should change during interaction periods 1 to
3. In the remaining periods, however, participants were matched
with those group members who held dissimilar opinions.
According to classical models of social influence, this should
motivate participants to develop more moderate opinions. As the
graph shows, opinions should then converge and the degree of bi-
polarization should decrease during the final four interaction
periods.
Models combining positive and negative
influence. These models assume that individuals are influenced
positively by interaction partners with similar opinions, and that
influence turns negative when individuals with dissimilar opinions
interact. Also this model was implemented with Equation 4, but
with additional assumptions about the influence weights which are
summarized in Equation 5 (which we adapted from Flache and
Ma¨s 2008a).
Figure 4. Predictions of existing social-influence models (left panel) and results of the experiment (right panel).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0074516.g004
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Equation 5 implies that influence weights adopt a value of +1,
whenever the opinions of two interaction partners do not differ
more than half of the range of the opinion scale. This implements
positive influence by similar interaction partners. However,
weights adopt negative values and result in negative influence
when opinion differences between interaction partners exceed the
threshold of half of the range of the opinion scale. Equation 5
assures that opinions remain within the bounds of the opinion
scale ({1ƒoi,tƒz1). To this end, negative influence weights
adopt smaller absolute values when i already holds an extreme
opinion.
The model with both positive and negative influence generates
predictions for the only-opinion condition in our experiment.
These predictions follow deterministically from Equations 4 and 5
and are graphically summarized in Panel B of Figure 4. The graph
shows that opinions remain unchanged when interaction partners
hold identical opinions (homophilous matching). However, nega-
tive influence results in more extreme opinions and bi-polarization
when dissimilar participants interact (heterophilous matching).
Predictions of ACTB. In order to implement the design
elements of the only-argument condition of our experiment as
closely as possible in the formal model, we adjusted those model
assumptions that concern the forgetting of arguments. Participants
could always see a complete list of those arguments that they had
received at the very beginning of the experiment plus those
arguments that they had received from interaction partners. This
was included to standardize the sending and receiving of
arguments, making sure that participants send exactly the same
arguments that they had received earlier. At the same time, this
procedure assured that participants would not forget arguments.
To include this in the formal model, we assumed that agents
consider all arguments as relevant that they came across at least
once during the influence process. Technically, this implies that
the number of salient arguments (Si,t) can vary between agents and
increase over time.
Finally, we implemented the same interaction schedule and the
same initial assignment of arguments as in the laboratory
experiment (P=C=6; Si,1 = 3). Unlike the models for the only-
opinion condition, the formal model contains even with these
modifications still a random component in the selection of the
communicated argument. Therefore, we conducted 500 indepen-
dent replications of the social-influence process and report average
developments in Figure 5.
Panel A in Figure 5 shows that the exchange of arguments with
agents who hold similar opinions leads according to ACTB to
intensified opinions and bi-polarization during the first three
interaction periods. This is because interaction partners either
provide each other with a new argument that supports their initial
opinion or with a counter argument that they already know.
However, as the results for the heterophilous interaction phase
show, ACTB predicts that argument exchange with the remaining
agents (periods 4 thru 7) leads to more moderate opinions as
agents are mainly exposed to arguments that do not support their
current opinions.
Comparison of the predictions. Panel A and B of Figure 4
and Panel A of Figure 5 visualize that the three formal models of
social influence imply critically different predictions for the setting
of the experiment. Two main differences draw attention. First,
only the model which includes positive and negative influence
(Panel B in Figure 4) predicts bi-polarization during the
heterophilous matching phase. Hence, observing this dynamic
under the experimental conditions where participants inform each
other about their opinions would support that interaction with
dissimilar others leads to negative influence. The model with
positive and negative influence is not directly applicable to the
Only-argument-condition, as participants were not informed about the
opinion of their current interaction partners. However, it can not
be fully precluded that participants inferred the opinion of their
interaction partner from the arguments they transmitted. Thus,
increasing degrees of bi-polarization during heterophilous match-
ing in the Only-arguments-condition would also support the negative
influence model.
Second, Panel A of Figure 5 shows that only ACTB predicts bi-
polarization during the homophilous matching phase. Finding this
dynamic in the conditions where participants could exchange
arguments would, thus, support ACTB. As participants in the
Only-opinion-condition could not communicate arguments, finding bi-
polarization during the homophilous matching phase of this
condition should not be interpreted as support for ACTB.
1.4.4. Participants. Members of a general pool of partici-
pants at the Department of Sociology at the University of
Groningen had been invited to participate in this experiment.
Interested students could register for a specific session using an
online form [92]. The study has been approved by the review
board of the Department of Sociology at the University of
Groningen. Written informed consent was obtained from each
participant before conducting the experiment. The recruitment
and the experiment complied with the guidelines set out by the
Sociological Laboratory of the Department of Sociology at the
University of Groningen (http://www.gmw.rug.nl/˜orsee/public/
index.php?language = en).
We assigned the sessions randomly to the three experimental
conditions. Participants received monetary compensation. After
excluding problematic sessions (see below), we included data of 65
female and 31 male participants in the analyses (N= 96). On
average, participants were 23 years old.
Altogether, we conducted 18 sessions with 8 participants per
session. However, we excluded 6 sessions from the analysis
because the manipulation of the initial opinions did not work out.
Even though participants received at the beginning of the
experiment two arguments favoring one of the two towns, it was
still possible that participants considered the one argument in
favor of the other town as most relevant. In some cases,
participants’ initial opinion therefore tended towards the town
for which fewer arguments were given. All sessions in which this
happened for more than one of the participant were excluded
from the analysis. This was necessary to ensure that the interaction
schedule imposed homophilous matching during the first three
interactions. Altogether, we used data from twelve sessions with
eight participants each for the statistical analyses (N= 96). For
each of the three conditions, four sessions are available (N= 32
each).
1.4.5. Results. Panel C in Figure 4, Panel B in Figure 5, and
Figure 6 picture the observed bi-polarization dynamics in the three
conditions of the experiment. Results are visualized in the same
way as the theoretical predictions. This allows direct comparison
of the predictions of the three theoretical models (panels on the
left-hand side) with the empirical findings for the corresponding
conditions of the experiment (panels on the right-hand side). To
also quantify bi-polarization dynamics in the three experimental
conditions, we estimated for each condition separately a linear
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regression with the degree of bi-polarization in each experimental
session as dependent and two period effects as independent
variables. The first period effect is designed to capture a possible
change in the degree of bi-polarization during the first three
interactions (Periods are coded: 0 1 2 3 3 3 3 3) and the second
allows to assess how much the degree of bi-polarization changed in
the remaining 4 interactions (Periods are coded: 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 4).
The regression coefficients of the two period effects indicate
whether there was bi-polarization (positive coefficient); no change
(insignificant coefficient); or whether opinion distance between the
two types decreased (negative coefficient). For each condition there
were 32 observations available (4 sessions68 opinion measure-
ments). In the following, we report the results of these regression
analyses. In addition, the estimates are summarized in Table S1 of
the supplementary information.
The figures show for all three conditions that there were
significant differences between the opinion averages of the two
types of participants already before the first interaction (interaction
period = 0). Also the initial degree of bi-polarization was in all
conditions significantly different from zero (t-values of intercepts in
the regressions range from 15.03 to 24.43). This demonstrates that
the assignment of arguments led to the desired opinion differences
between the two types. Comparing the initial degree of bi-
polarization which we observed in the experiment (right panel)
with the expected initial degree of bi-polarization (left panel), one
can see that the observed values even exceed the expectations.
This discrepancy does not affect our test, however, because we
focus on the direction of change of opinion differences rather than
the absolute opinion differences.
In the Only-opinion-condition of the experiment, the degree of bi-
polarization hardly changed during the first three interactions.
Actually, it decreased on average by 0.21 during the first three
interactions. The decrease is not significantly different from zero
(t =20.42). This was different under the Only-argument-condition and
the Opinions and arguments-condition. In both conditions the degree of
bi-polarization significantly increased per interaction, by 1.71
(t = 2.98) and 1.91 (t = 2.15) respectively.
Dynamics changed when interaction partners with different
opinions were matched (interaction period.3). Under all three
conditions of the experiment, we found decreasing opinion
differences between the two types of participants. In the Only-
opinion-condition, the degree of bi-polarization decreased on average
by 1.01. This effect differs significantly from zero (t =22.77) but
the confidence interval of the effect reveals that it does not differ
significantly from the weak decrease during the first three
interactions. In the Only-argument-condition and the Opinions and
arguments-condition, the degree of bi-polarization decreased from
interaction period 4 on by 2.75 (t =26.5) and 2.74 (t =24.17) on
average. In both conditions, this decrease during the interactions 4
thru 7 differs significantly from zero and therefore also from the
increase during the first three interactions.
We also wanted to test whether or not the dynamics of bi-
polarization differed significantly between the three conditions. To
this end, we estimated a regression that tested differences between
the Only-opinion-condition (reference category) on the one hand and
the Only-argument-condition and the Opinions and arguments-condition on
the other hand. For this purpose, we used the same regression
approach as for the separate models and included main and
interaction effects for the experimental conditions. The results are
summarized in Tables S2 and S3. It turned out that the increase in
the degree of bi-polarization during the first three interactions was
significantly stronger in both the Only-argument-condition (t = 2.01)
and the Opinions and arguments-condition (t = 2.22) than it was in the
Only-opinion-condition.
We found furthermore that the decrease in the degree of bi-
polarization during the final four interaction periods was
significantly stronger in the Only-argument-condition (t =22.47) and
the Opinions and arguments-condition (t =22.44) as compared to the
Only-opinion-condition. A comparison of the differences between the
Only-argument-condition and the Opinions and arguments-condition
revealed that both the developments during the first three
interactions (t = .19) and the subsequent finteractions (t = .02) did
not differ significantly between the two conditions.
In sum, there are three main findings. First, we found opinion
convergence during the heterophilous-matching phase of all
experimental conditions. This challenges the prediction of social-
influence models that assume both positive and negative influence
(see Panel B of Figure 4) and demonstrates that in the setting of
this experiment participants were not negatively influenced by
their interaction partners.
Figure 5. Predictions of ACTB (left panel) and results of the experiment (right panel).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0074516.g005
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Second, in both conditions where participants transmitted
arguments we found bi-polarization during the homophilous
matching phase. This supports ACTB because only ACTB is able
to explain bi-polarization in this phase of the experiment. What is
more, bi-polarization was not found during the homophilous
matching phase under the only-opinions-condition, suggesting that the
core theoretical ingredient that ACTB adds to existing models of
social influence, argument communication, is responsible for the
bi-polarization tendencies which we found under the conditions
where participants transmitted arguments.
Third, we did not find significant differences in the bi-
polarization dynamics under the Only-argument-condition and the
Opinion-and-argument-condition. This indicates that the effect of
argument exchange is robust to influences of opinions.
Conclusions
In this article, we have provided both theoretical and empirical
support for the claim that bi-polarization can emerge even when
individuals do not seek to increase opinion differences to disliked
members of the population. Our theoretical contribution focused
on demonstrating the logical validity of this claim, presenting and
analyzing a formal model of social influence that includes
argument communication, the core ingredient of the new theory.
Our laboratory experiment supported that even in a setting
where we did not find support for negative influence groups may
exhibit bi-polarization. What is more, we found bi-polarization
only in those experimental conditions where social influence was
based on argument communication and did not find increasing
opinion differences in a condition where social influence was based
only on opinions. This supports our claim that communication
based on arguments implies substantially different opinion
dynamics than communication that is based on opinions. What
is more, experimental results suggest that the bi-polarization
tendencies that are created by the communication of arguments
are robust to the effects of simultaneous opinion communication.
In sum, the results of our experiments support that argument
communication in tandem with homophily can give rise to bi-
polarization even in the absence of negative influence based on
exposure to opinions.
These findings provide the following insights for future research.
First, future modeling research is needed to compare ACTB with
an alternative approach that was recently proposed by Dandekar
et al. [93]. This model assumes so-called ‘‘biased assimilation’’, the
tendency of individuals to readily accept evidence that confirms
their opinions while carefully scrutinizing disconfirming informa-
tion. Unlike in our formal representation of ACTB, information
sharing and processing is not modeled explicitly by Dandekar
et al. However, it is assumed that individuals’ opinions intensify
when they interact with likeminded others, which is a core
implication of ACTB. Therefore, future research should explore to
what extent the two models predict bi-polarization under similar
conditions.
Second, our study explored whether the interplay of homophily
and argument exchange can lead to bi-polarization, testing the
possibility to explain bi-polarization of continuous opinions
without assuming negative influence. Nevertheless, an open
question is whether empirical bi-polarization tendencies [33–
37,94] are better explained with negative influence, or with
argument communication. Answering this question is an intricate
problem because the two mechanisms are very similar in their
predicted outcomes and might also act in tandem. It appears
possible, for instance, that the interplay of strong homophily and
argument exchange gives rise to opinion differences in an initially
Figure 6. Dynamics found under the Opinions-and-arguments-condition.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0074516.g006
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homogenous population. Once these differences have become
sufficiently pronounced and salient, negative influence might
unfold and further intensify them.
A potential strategy to disentangle the effects of argument
exchange and negative influence and to assess which mechanism
dominates under given conditions might be to study effects of the
so called ‘‘timing of contacts’’ [28]. Our experimental results
support that influence with persuasive arguments increases bi-
polarization when individuals interact in a first phase with similar
others and leads to opinion convergence when individuals with
opposing views are brought into contact in a second phase.
Strikingly, models that assume negative influence predict the
opposite dynamic [28]. In the first phase, similarity between
interaction partners results in their model in converging views. In
the second phase, however, opinion differences create negative
influence and bi-polarization. Hence, experimentally manipulating
the timing of contacts might allow testing whether bi-polarization
tendencies result from negative influence or homophilous argu-
ment exchange.
Third, our computer-simulation study found that the exchange
of persuasive arguments entails bi-polarization only if the selection
of interaction partners is shaped by strong homophily, suggesting
that a moderate tendency to interact with likeminded others may
not suffice to create bi-polarization as long as individuals
occasionally engage in exchange of arguments with people who
hold dissimilar opinions. Empirical research shows that homophily
is a strong force in many social settings [51]. However, it appears
questionable whether homophily is strong enough to explain e.g.
the increasing divide on issues like abortion, sexual morality and
the war in Iraq that scholars have observed in contemporary
America [15,34,38,94].
On the other hand, focusing on the core mechanisms that might
create bi-polarization, our formal model abstracts from parallel
processes that may amplify the bi-polarizing effects of argument
exchange. For instance, trying to avoid cognitive inconsistency
[58,59], individuals may tend to systematically disregard those
arguments that contradict their current opinion, a process that is
similar to the notion of biased assimilation as studied by Dandekar
et al. [93]. Accordingly, individuals may tend to base their
opinions only on arguments that support their opinions and may
hesitate to bring up counter arguments during argument exchange
with likeminded others. This process has the potential to amplify
the bi-polarization tendencies that argument communication and
homophily cause in our model and might therefore help
explaining bi-polarization in settings where homophily is weak.
What is more, observers of the internet have raised concerns
that recent technical developments of social networking sites and
internet search-engines create an additional source of homophily
which may be neither wanted nor recognized by users but has the
potential to dramatically shape interaction [93,95,96]. New linking
algorithms on social networking sites establish network contacts
between users with similar interests and systemically cut off ties
between users who do not interact frequently. Users complain that
their social networks on these sites have turned very homogeneous
and consist nearly exclusively of likeminded friends even though
they used to have links to users with opposite political attitudes
[95]. A similar effect has been attributed to Internet search engines
that use personalized search algorithms. These algorithms have
been developed to generate search results that reflect the interests
of individual users. A disadvantage, however, may be that internet
users will find it difficult to locate websites which support opposing
opinions. In sum, these new technologies increase the degree to
which users are exposed to arguments of likeminded others,
making bi-polarization more likely according to ACTB. Future
empirical research and modeling work is needed to understand the
impact of these new technologies on the social networks of Internet
users and their potential impact on large-scale opinion dynamics.
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